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Rape Law Reform's Limits 
A Senior Honors Thesis 




Anti-Rape Activism: Exploding Myths and 
Interrogating Institutions 
The Second Wave of "The" United States Women's Movement 
began in the mid 1970's (Feree & Hess, 1985). Members of this 
major fe minist move ment began to examine a range of issues that 
surround the way gender functions in this country. Most of the 
issues addressed within this fe minist move ment were ones that 
pertained to the health and happiness of white, middle-class, 
heterosexual women (hooks, 1984, Snitow et. aI., 1983). Although 
women of color, working-class whites, and lesbian and bisexual 
women were all represented within the early stages of the 
movement, the white, middle-class, heterosexual participants tended 
focus on issues that pertained to their personal needs (hooks, 1984). 
This was compounded by the fact that this redirection of focus was 
not done in a self-conscious way (Mohanty. 1991) Because of this 
dynamic other forms of feminism's have arisen, such as: Third World 
Feminism, African-American Feminism, Lesbian-Feminism, Queer 
feminist thought, Working-Class Feminism, as well as many others. 
For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the white, middle-class, 
heterosexual women's movement as" the Second Wave of Feminism" 
since this is what the movement participants named themselves 
(Feree & Hess, 1985). I do not mean to imply that this movement is 
by any means the only, or the most important contemporary feminist 
movement. When I use the word "women" I am using it in the 
context in which the movement participants utilized it. Again, I am 
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not implying that the themes that I am discussing necessarily apply 
to all women. 
One of the major issues that the members of the Second Wave 
of the Women's Movement grappled with was the ways in which 
violence functioned in women's lives (Galvin, 1985). Theorists began 
exploring the syste mic nature of gendered violence. This 
examination took place on many different levels, and in a variety of 
arenas. Counselors, social theorists, legal theorists, journalists, media 
critics, as well as women who had personal experiences with violence 
all began to mobilize around the proble m of sexual violence 
(Bumiller, 1987). Rap~ and sexual assault soon became issues around 
which a sub-movement developed. This has been termed the Anti-
Rape Movement (Matthews, 1988, Bumiller, 1987). 
The Anti-Rape Movement was a somewhat unusual movement, 
in that individuals mobilized around a specific phenomenon that is 
usually highly traumatic. Because of this, many of the Anti-Rape 
Movement members produced literature on a the personal, 
psychological dynamics of rape. Rape crisis centers and battered 
women's shelters began forming to offer survivors of sexual violence 
an alternative to an often insensitive and uninformed mental health 
system (Frazier & Borgida, 1992). Other members focused on 
exposing the interconnectedness of sexual assault and gendered 
oppression (Dworkin,1989). A smaller, more liberal (as opposed to 
more radical), subset focused on the way that rape was treated 
under the law (Bumiller, 1987). Legal theorists, litigators, and 
activist lobbyists began to analyze and scrutinize the laws in their 
individual states (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992; Bumiller, 1987). 
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Reforms to problematic rape laws were created and fought for by 
these groups. 
Rape Mythology and the Feminist Attack 
One of the central foci of the anti-rape move ment was the 
exposure of popular views of rape, rapists, and rape victims (Estrich, 
1987). This was seen as a vital step toward bringing a more 
comprehensive understanding of the issues surrounding rape to the 
general public, as well as to victims (Bumiller, 1987). Leaders felt 
that before information could be accepted, the old stereotypes had to 
be interrogated. As I have stated above, these leaders were often 
white, and often did not feel that focusing on the racial dynamics 
that existed within rape mythology should be prioritized (Wriggins, 
1983). Because of this bias, the myths that they attempted to expose 
were often tailored to the experiences white, middle-class 
heterosexual women. If there was an attempt to include issues that 
were specific to the experience of women of color, many of these 
early leaders would merely generalize their theories to "all Women" 
(Mohanty, 1988). There was little concern over whether the "rape 
truths" that they were championing were based on racist myths that 
these feminists had not challenged themselves. Some of the authors, 
such as Susan Brownmiller, wrote explicitly about race; yet her 
analysis proved to be filled with racist ideologies (Davis, 1983). This 
has been pointed out as a major flaw of the anti-rape movement by 
African-American Feminists (Wriggins, 1983; Bumiller, 1987). 
Lesbian, gay, and queer theorists have often been criticism 
these early feminist analyses as heterosexist (Snitow et. al, 1983). 
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These theorists felt that some of the proposed reforms rape laws did 
not adequately account for same-sex assault on the stranger 
acquaintance, or relationship levels. Other lesbian theorists have 
vociferously disputed this contestation. This split has taken the form 
of some theorists wishing to expose lesbian battery, and others 
wanting to hide it from the mainstream (or refuse that it exists) 
(Malone, 1994). Most of these theorists agree that sexual assaults 
that are brought about by homophobia (i.e. a heterosexual is 
offended or threatened by homosexuality, and therefore rapes) have 
received too little attention. 
Despite the lack of self -consciousness, and often racist, classist, 
and/or heterosexist assumptions that were made within in the 
move ment literature, it is important to examine the major analyses 
of rape myths if we are to understand the building blocks of 
legislative rape reforms. There were specific myths that were most 
often attacked by movement theorists and activists (Estrich, 1987; 
Brown miller, 1975; Frayling, 1986). Here I offer a composite of the 
aspects that some of these theorists have elucidated. The rapist is a 
strange man that is large, lecherous, predatory, and pathological. He 
is thought of as strong and violent, he carries a weapon, and 
threatens the helpless fe male victim if she does not comply. He is 
psychologically disturbed, and has no intimates. The woman that 
gets attacked is virtuous, chaste, and either a virgin or a wife. She 
has never seen this man; and if he attempted to coerce her into an 
interaction before the actual attack, she atte mpted to deflect his 
advances. She is petite, attractive, innocent, and utterly helpless. 
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She knows to tell her father or husband about the attack (which is 
forced coitus), and immediately goes to the police or the hospital. 
If the activist describing the myth placed value on racial issues, 
slhe might have specified that this myth included a racialization of 
the actors (Wriggins, 1983; Davis, 1984; Bumiller, 1987; Collins, 
1990). In that case, the assailant is a black man and the victim is a 
white woman. There might be additional factors such as, the black 
assailant was on drugs, or that he rob s the victim as well. Other 
feminists have excluded making this portion of the myth visible 
because they felt that black men were a threat (and possibly a bigger 
threat than white men); and that exploding that part of the myth 
would harm the struggle against rape (Brownmiller). This type of 
exclusion was a subtle form of racism that was characteristic of many 
white movement members. It was based in racist mythologies about 
rape that many members of the movement chose to ignore in their 
analyses. 
The myths that exist pertaining to child molestation do not 
differ that greatly from those that surround adult rape. Again the 
molester is a male adult who is psychologically disturbed. He is also 
a rare breed of deviant. He is a stranger that will approach children 
in parks, zoos or in school yards. He atte mpts to offer little girls 
candy or other such rewards so that they will trust him. He then 
forces them into a sexual act. As soon as the child is released she 
runs home and tells her parents or a teacher. She does not return to 
the molester, even if he has threatened her or her family if she does 




Anti-rape activists did not map out these myths in order to 
deny that these forms of sexual assault, or any of the behaviors of 
the parties involved, do not occur. Rather, their goal was to educate 
the public that not all rapes or acts of molestation followed these 
patterns (Estrich, 1987). The activists were responding to the way 
courts. hospitals. mental health care workers. the media etc. tended 
to disbelieve that other forms of rape were. in fact. criminal and 
harmful behavior (Estrich. 1987; Brownmiller. 1975). They were also 
attempting to pinpoint the justifications for the tendency to blame 
the victim for the attack if slhe or the attacker did not parallel the 
myth in any way (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). 
Criticizing the Legal Syste m 
Dispelling these stereotypes was a major focus for the rape law 
reform movement (Bumiller, 1987). The reformers hypothesized 
that members of the legal system, jurors. and the actual laws often 
accepted and perpetuated these myths (Estrich, 1987; Horney and 
Spohn 1991; Matoesian. 1993). They theorized that in the courtroom 
the victim was further victimized if slhe did not fit into these 
perceptions (Estrich. 1987; Matoesian, 1993). They also noted that 
the burden of proof was often on the ascriptive characteristics and 
the pattern of behavior of the perpetrator involved (Estrich, 1987). 
If slhe proved to deviate from what a rapist was su pposed to be. 
again the blame would be shifted on to the victim (Estrich, 1987; 
Brown miller. 1975). The reformers hypothesized that there were a 
set of complex justifications that led many people to blame the 
victim rather than the assailant (Estrich. 1987; Matoesian. 1993; 
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Brownmiller 1975). What the rape law reform movement sought to 
do by altering the laws was to shift the blame from the victim, to the 
offender by focusing on his/her behaviors (Bumiller, 1987). 
Some strains of the movement focused on strategies of shifting 
popular opinion from judging on the basis of the victim's and the 
assailant's ascriptive characteristics (W riggins, 1983; Estrich 1987). 
These theorists sought to achieve attitudinal changes within the 
general public. For the most part, due to the rigidity of the legal 
system, as well as the constitutional premise of due process under 
the law, legal reform was seen as an impractical forum for this type 
of change. Such thought was more an influence to reform existing 
laws, rather than a solid basis for the reforms themselves 
(Matoesian, 1993). 
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The Scope of This Essay 
The literature that was produced by this movement attacked 
the laws from a few different, but often overlapping, angles. The 
first that I will explore is the criticism of the wording of the law. 
Defining the crime of rape was seen as vital, in that, in many states it 
was impossible to get a conviction for certain types of sexual 
assaults, simply because statutorily they did not exist (Chappell. 
1976). The second aspect of rape reform theory that I will review is 
the arguments that attempt to prove that rape is similar to other 
forms of criminal assault. This body of thought fits into an equality 
based argument that has been championed by some feminist legal 
theorists that deal with a great variety of subject matter (Bartlett & 
Kennedy, 1991). These theorists have worked to reduce the 
sentiment that rape is a special case because it involves sexual 
activities or motives. This type of theory has been highly influenced 
by the school of thought within the rape crisis movement that rape is 
not sex, it is violence (Brownmiller, 1975). 
Some rape law reformers have argued the opposite, however. 
These reformer spoke out about how rape is special case, unlike all 
other forms of assault. Feminist legal theorists have classified this 
type of argument as the difference approach (Bartlett & Kennedy, 
1991). Some of the more extreme difference reformers argue that 
the rape of a woman by a man is what the law should focus on 
(MacKinnon, 1984). They feel that this is a particularly pervasive 
and insidious form of misogynist brutality, and that the law should 
recognize it as such. Oddly enough, the schools of thought that argue 
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that rape is like other assault, and those who argue that it is 
different are not diametrically opposed. They often agree on the 
fundamental points, but argue over what should be focused on, or 
the most expedient way to solve the problem of rape. I devote the 
third section to the theories that exist within the difference 
approach. 
There are some aspects of reform that defy fitting into the 
above these categories. This is largely due to the fact that these 
reforms often fit into both. The fourth and fifth sections are allotted 
to rape shield law, and the influence of officials' and juror's biases. 
Rape shield laws are laws that have been constructed to legally 
prohibit the misuse of a rape victim's sexual history (Horney & 
Spohn, 1991). Shield laws have been enacted in nearly every state, 
and have taken many forms (Winter, 1989). I have devoted the 
sixth section to an examination of the way race has functioned within 
the history of sexual assault in the United States. This history serves 
to challenge the way reformers have criticized the laws (Wriggins, 
1983). I have devoted a separate section to these phenomena 
because of the lack of acceptance of this form of thought within the 
Second Wave of the Feminist Movement (hooks, 1984: Collins, 1990). 
The battle to dispel rape myths within the legal system is what 
comprises the final section. It has been shown that the biases that 
courtroom members hold are some of the most influential factors in 
determining conviction rates (Spohn & Horney, 1991). This has 
become a major area of study. The way that these issues factor into 
the actual rape law reforms is that they reflect on the ways that 





1993). They challenge reformers to enact more sophisticated 
reforms, as well as giving a perspective on what other move ment 
activities need to be performed to effect legal change. 
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Redefining The Crime 
The legal definition of rape has been challenged by fe minist 
theorists (Chappell 1976). This battle had been fought on both the 
state and the federal levels (Winter, 1989). Although the federal 
rape laws have been amended, the creation of criminal law is mainly 
left to the individual states. To date, the Supreme Court has not 
passed any land mark cases on criminal rape that would adhere to 
the rape law reform movement's goals. 
In their discussion of definitional change, reformers have noted 
the historical shape of these laws, across states. The classic common 
law definition of rape has been, "Unlawful carnal knowledge of a 
woman by force and without her consent... .. (Chappell 1976: 131). A 
more recent definition that has been said to be typically used and 
enforced is, 
..... rape is the act of sexual intercourse with a woman 
other than the wife of the offender and without her 
lawful consent. Emission is not necessary, and 
penetration however slight is sufficient to complete the 
crime." (Chappell, 1976:131). 
Many states have devoted space in their definition of rape to 
requiring that the woman prove that she had resisted during the 
assault. I will discuss the resistance requirement in an upcoming 
section. 
The reformers' criticisms of these definitions were based on a 
few factors, To begin, the use of the words "by force and without her 




generally interpreted is that unless the man is physically holding the 
woman down, is visibly larger and stronger than she is, or is beating 
her through the entire act that force has not been used (Estrich, 
1987). The exception that is often acceptable, if these factors are 
absent, is that the attack was rape if the perpetrator is brandishing a 
weapon (Estrich, 1987). When these factors are not present, often 
the question within the courtroom shifts from whether the assailant 
forced the sexual encounter, to whether the victim consented to it 
(Estrich, 1987). Feminist writers have noted that widespread belief 
in these hypothetical phenomena has served to invalidate most rapes 
that are played out differently (Estrich, 1987, Brownmiller 1975). 
Susan Estrich has distinguished between these rapes by terming the 
rapes that people tend to believe as "'real rape", and any other form 
of rape "'simple rape" (Estrich, 1987). Some writers have noted that 
this is both due to the use of the word "'force", as well as the 
perception of that word by me mbers of the legal decision making 
process (justices, jurors, attorneys, etc.) (Horney & Spohn, 1991; 
Spohn & Horney, 1991). The interpretation that they have seen as 
biased and eXClusive, perpetuated (and has been perpetuated by) the 
rape myths that I have discussed above. Feminists have documented 
the widespread fear that might im mobilize a person who is being 
sexually assaulted; and specifically how this is intensified for women 
(Frazier & Borgida, 1992). They have also criticized the fact that this 
definition does not account for cases in which the person who is 
being assaulted has been rendered incapable of fighting due to the 
fact that s/he might be unconscious or se miconscious from the 








1976). The reform that has been advocated to amend the 
definitional deficit has been the inclusion of the word ··coercion·· as 
well as ·"force··. There have also been campaigns to have the law 
explicitly state that it is illegal to engage in sexual intercourse with a 
person if he/she is unconscious or otherwise unable to respond 
(Chappell, 1976). 
Another issue that reformers have criticized, and is exemplified 
by these com mon legal definitions of rape, is that it has been 
acceptable for a man to sexually assault his wife (Sigler & Haywood, 
1987). Historically married women have been viewed as the 
property of their husbands, and had no legal rights of their own 
(Wriggins, 1983; Sigler & Haygood, 1987). Wives were said to be 
there for their husband·s sexual disposal, doing their ··wifely duty··. 
Because legally they had no personal agency, specifically against 
their husbands, wives could not prosecute their husbands for sexual 
assault (Sigler & Haygood, 1987; Jeffords & Dull, 1982). This concern 
has fed into a fe minist discourse surrounding domestic violence that 
has expanded into discussions of different methods of sexual assault 
within just marriage, as well as other forms of intimate personal 
relationships (Dworkin, 1989). This is one area where the earlier 
discussion of the use of the word force has been contested. Theorists 
have explored the dynamics that function within (primarily 
heterosexual) relationships that could lead to one partner being 
sexually assaulted through use of emotional/sexual manipulation 
(Russell, 1990; Dworkin, 1989). This manipulation often functions to 
inhibit the ab used partner from labeling what happened as sexual 
assault (Russell, 1990). It has often also led the abused partner to 
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not to report sexual violence as sexual assault (Russell, 1990). This 
has been said to occur because of fear of repercussions by the 
assailant, shame that the assault(s) occurred, or fear of loss of 
economic support from the abusing spouse (Russell, 1990). All of 
these fears have been reinforced by a legal syste m that does not 
consider rape within marriage unacceptable (Russell, 1990; Dworkin, 
1989 ). 
Robert T. Sigler and Donna Haygood sampled adults in 
Tuscaloosa, Alabama (Sigler & Haygood, 1987). Their aim in this 
exploratory search was to, " ... measure public attitudes toward forced 
marital intercourse, orientation toward traditional sex roles, and a set 
of demographic variables." (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 76). They found 
a high rate of endorsement of traditional roles within their sample 
(j.e women should be in the home etc.). They also found that their 
sample was willing to "endorse a felony penalty for most forms of 
forced sexual intercourse" (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 78). The other 
side of this, however, was that as the degree of intimacy between the 
actors increased, the endorsement of a felony ruling decreased, with 
one exception that is irrelevant to this discussion (Sigler & Haygood, 
1987: 78). When the researchers looked at the percentages of 
individuals who felt that forced marital intercourse should be a 
felony (33.1 %), it was lower than those who felt that a misdemeanor 
was more appropriate (45.2%) (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 78). When 
they broke these statistics down to the group levelS, they found that 
"Males, blacks, and those with high church attendance tend to favor 
felony legislation while fe males, and whites tend to favor 
misdemeanor legislation (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 79). They also 
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found that 57% of those surveyed felt that forced marital intercourse 
should be a criminal offense (regardless of the degree of punishment 
that they felt was appropriate) (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 83), The 
researchers noted that those individuals that expressed belief in the 
law's effectiveness felt that stronger penalties were appropriate for 
marital rape, while those who were more cynical about the 
effectiveness of the legal syste m endorsed lesser sanctions (Sigler & 
Haygood, 1987: 83), They summarized by stating that, 
"Attitudes about the traditional roles of women, the 
effectiveness of the law, the perceptions of rape as an 
assaultive act, and the right of wives to control sexual 
access appear to be associated with endorsement of 
legislation and the degree of sanction endorsement." 
(Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 84) 
Their study shows that there is not a great deal of support for 
criminalizing forced marital intercourse, This finding might be 
somewhat de mographically specific, considering that it was done in 
the South, which is often assumed to be conservative (Sigler & 
Haygood, 1987), 
The study that Charles R. Jeffords and R. Thomas Dull 
performed focused on the de mographic aspects that might factor into 
one's attitudes toward marital rape immunity under the law 
(Jeffords and DUll, 1982), Their sample of Texas residents was quite 
large (1300 individuals), Only 35 % of the respondents favored 
legislation that criminalized marital rape, They explained that "this 
percentage varied significantly among the values of several 





that they found were significant were sex, age, education, and 
marital status; they found that race, family income, and community 
size were not significant. Jeffords and Dull found that gender was 
highly influential when deciding whether marital rape should be 
illegal across each demographic group. They found that 45% of the 
women surveyed thought that marital rape should be classified as a 
criminal offense, while only 25% of the men did (Jeffords & Dull 
1982: 758). They also found that younger people were more likely 
to be in favor of a legal sanction. Their statistics showed that single 
people were more likely to be in favor of a prohibitory law (45%) 
than nonsingle people (33%) (Jeffords and Dull 1982: 759). The 
researchers went on to explain that those respondents with more 
education (i.e. if they had a college degree, 41 %) tended to agree with 
creating such a law more than those who did not grad uate from high 
school (28%) (Jeffords & Dull 1982: 756). The factors that the 
researchers noted, that might have made their sample less 
generalizable to other states were the fact that it was done in a 
conservative state (Texas); that the state maintains complete 
immunity for husbands that rape; and that the term rape was used 
as opposed to a less volatile word. The researchers also hypothesized 
that, due to the age discrepancies, the newer generations might be 
becoming more tolerant of marital rape legislation. They feel that 
this might indicate that more conservative states will abolish spousal 
immunity laws in the future (Jeffords and Dull, 1982). 
These studies show that there is not a great deal of acceptance 
for a marital rape statute. Sigler and Haygood found that 57% of 
their sample supported this form of statute, while only 35% of 
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Jeffords and Dull's su pported criminalizing forced marital intercourse 
(Sigler & Haygood, 1987; Jeffords and Dull, 1982). Again, these 
attitudes were done in somewhat conservative states. These states 
did nbt already have this form of legislation on the books, which 
might also be a reason why the attitudes were so permissive to 
spousal immunity (Sigler & Haygood, 1987; Jeffords and Dull, 1982). 
Diana E. Russell's book Rape in Marriage is an in-depth study 
on the dynamics of marital rape. Although this is a fascinating study 
that involves a large sample, her focus was not on the legal aspects of 
rape. She aimed, rather, to elucidate the dynamics of marital rape, 
and the experiences that the women had because of it. This is an 
extremely important work, especially in terms of understanding the 
frequency and brutality involved in martial rape (Russell, 1990). 
Another highly contested aspect of the legal definitions of rape 
is that they have often included the terms "carnal knowledge"2 or 
"sexual intercourse" (Chappell, 1976). This has been contested 
because these terms have been used to specify rape as a penis being 
forced into a vagina. Feminist theorists and Lesbian-Feminists have 
elucidated that other forms of sexual assault are extremely harmful 
as well (Brownmiller, 1975; Snitowet. aI., 1983; Estrich, 1987, 
Burgess, 1985). These have been not been recognized as criminal 
sexual acts when this narrow definition has been used. Anal 
penetration, oral penetration, cunnilingus (whether on the victim or 
the offender), analingus (whether on the victim or the offender), or 
penetration of any orifice with any object or body part that is not a 
penis have been cited as acts that constitute sexual assault if brought 
2 Carnal Knowledge is defined as sexual intercourse. 
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about by force, coercion or intimidation. There has been an 
argument that sodomy laws protect against these acts of sexual 
assault. The counter argu ments have been that the acts the mselves 
should not be criminalized, but rather their perpetration against the 
will of another is what should define the crime (Snitow, et. aI., 1983). 
This discussion of which acts, when performed against 
another's will, should be constituted as sexual assault brings the 
gender of the actors into question. Rape law reform theorists have 
hypothesized over the importance of making the definition of rape 
gender-neutral, or keeping it specific to when men rape women 
(Bumiller, 1987). There has been a great deal of discussion, in 
general, over rendering laws gender-neutral within the fe minist legal 
theory (Bartlett & Kennedy 1991; Bumiller, 1987). Some feminists 
have felt that gender-neutrality is a vital part of redefining rape in a 
way that is inclusive of all possibilities. They feel that this would 
open up options for prosecuting all sexual violations that occur 
(Bumiller, 1987). Alternatively, it has been argued that there is a 
historic pattern, which all women have inherited, that men rape 
women (Bumiller, 1987). They feel that enacting definitional 
changes that would render the laws gender neutral would be divisive 
to convicting what they consider to be the more important rapes 
(male/female) (Wriggins, 1983). There have been heated debates 
countering this position, stating that it universalizes women's 
histories, and is insensitive to the racist history that rape has 
(Wriggins, 1983). It has also been strongly protested in terms of 
same-sex assault issues (Snitow et. al.). 
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Linda Brookover Bourque conducted a study on community 
attitudes concerning rape in Los Angeles (Bourq ue, 1989 LOne 
portion of the study was devoted to how the respondents defined 
rape (both personally and legally), and the similarities that the 
reported definitions had to California's legal definition. At that time 
(1979) California defined rape as, 
" ... an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a 
person, not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of 
the following circumstances ... (I)Where it is accomplished 
against a person's will by means of force or fear of 
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or 
another..." (West California Codes, 1983; Bourq ue, 1989) 
Out of her sample of ISS people, only 50 percent offered a legal 
definition of rape, as opposed to all but 8 people (out of the entire 
sample) offering a personal definition of rape (Bourque, 1989: 255). 
She found that there was a tendency for the respondents who did 
provide a legal definition to have a personal definition that was 
closer to the 1979 California Statute; the trend was not significant, 
however. She also found that people that gave both definitions 
tended toward being in line with the statute. She found that older 
whites proved more likely to give a legal definition. Bourque's 
findings also indicated that those individuals who's definitions were 
similar to the statute, and who included references to sexual activity 
were more likely to offer a legal definition of rape. Of those who 
offered the legal definitions, lower-income white fe males were most 
likely to " .. .incorporate multiple components into their legal 
definitions." (Bourque, 1989: 261) She also found that black females 
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with higher incomes were most likely to provide legal definitions 
resembling the California statute. Bourque reported that 
respondents whom defined rape as an act that (only) involves force, 
were more likely to offer legal definitions. Those respondents who 
prioritized resistance in their personal definition of rape were the 
least likely to offer a legal definition (Bourque, 1989). This suggests 
that those who were more likely to devote their energies to thinking 
about the law, were also more likely to offer a narrow and 
stereotypical definition of rape. 
The discussion surrounding the reform of definitions of rape is 
highly charged. This is due to the fact that the definition serves to 
symbolize the legal system's opinion of what rape is (Wriggins, 1983; 
Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). Because it is the starting block for 
recognition of what constitutes rape, reformers have invested a good 
deal of resources in to effecting these changes (Goldberg-Ambrose, 
1992), It is probably the most symbolic aspect of the rape law 





Arguing That Rape il Like Other Forms of Assault 
There is a history of the legal system treating sexual assault 
differently from other forms of assault (Chappell, 1976). Many rape 
law reformers attacked this position, and argued that sexual assault 
should be seen as having the same dynamics as other assaults 
(Caringella-MacDonald, 1985; Sahjpaul & Renner, 1988). This 
argument was born out of the school of thought that sought to 
redefine rape as violence, rather than sex (Brownmiller, 1975). It 
was seen as politically and emotionally strategic to focus on the 
brutality aspect (though not necessarily overtly violent component) 
of rape (Brownmiller, 1975). Politically this was done to combat the 
widespread myth that women find rape sexually exciting, as well as 
to express the pain and suffering that a rape victim experiences 
(Estrich, 1987). Emotionally it functioned to communicate that the 
subtle undertone of consentuality that the word "sex" conjures up in 
no way applies to rape(Estrich, 1987). It was thought to allow 
survivors of sexual assault a symbolic distance between violation and 
consentua1 sexual activity that they engaged in either before or after 
the assault. For these reasons, normalizing the view that all rape is 
inherently violent, regardless of the degree of force used, has been 
seen as a vital piece of rape law reform (Estrich, 1987, Brownmiller, 
1975, Russell, 1990). 
One aspect of traditional rape law that has been criticized is the 
resistance requirement (Chappell. 1976; Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). 
Aside from the use of the word force in the definition of rape, many 




victim must have shown the utmost resistance at the time of the 
assault." (ChappeJJ, 1976) This has been seen as problematic in that 
it circumscribes the behavior of the person getting attacked; the 
innocent party (Estrich, 1987). It has been argued that this sort of 
restriction has not been placed on victims of other forms of assault 
(Wriggins, 1983; Estrich, 1987). Some feminists have theorized that 
this is a way that rape laws are discriminate against women 
(Brown miller, 1975). They have argued that this sort of statute was 
created in an attempt to expose women who are claiming rape as an 
act of vindication, rather than because an assault actually occurred 
(Estrich, 1987; BrownmiJJer, 1975). Some have gone on to claim that 
the resistance requirement arose because of a perception that due to 
the sexual nature of rape, and the frequent lack of communication 
during sex, the assailant may not have been properly notified of the 
non-consentual nature of the crime (Brown miller, 1975). Bienin 
examines the mistake-of-fact defense within rape cases, and how it 
has been used to subvert rape law reforms (Bienin, 1978). This is a 
defense that has been used when the assailant allegedly does not 
know that the interaction is not consentual. Many have arrived at 
the conclusion that the resistance requirement and the rationales 
that surround it assist in the dynamic of blaming the victim of rape 
for the assault (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). 
Reformers have felt that by focusing on the victims response, 
rather than the assailant's behavior, the victim is put in a position of 
having to defend her Ihis actions (Estrich, 1987). Also, as I discussed 
above, reformers have noted that fear serves to make individuals act 
differently. If the victim of a rape, for example, becomes so terrified 
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that slhe freezes, slhe would not meet the resistance require ment 
(Burgess, 1985; Frazier & Bordiga, 1992). 
Another contested aspect of traditional rape law that again 
symbolizes the law's mistrust of the complainant in rape cases, has 
been the corroboration requirement (Chappell, 1976). This was a 
statute that required the victim of a rape to prove that the rape 
occurred through corroborative evidence. It served to render the 
victim's testimony as incomplete evidence, and therefore discouraged 
many victims from prosecuting (Estrich, 1987; Chappell, 1976). Once 
again, it has been pointed out that no other crimes involving assault 
have required corroboratory evidence. For many of the reasons that 
I have stated above, this has been seen as a way of overtly 
distrusting the victim's account testimony (Estrich, 1987; Chappell, 
1976). Again, it places a suspicious eye on the victim (in a way that 
is absent in other criminal cases) (Estrich, 1987; Chappell, 1976). A 
strong argument has been made that this statute is problematic due 
to the fact that often rape (by strangers, acquaintances, or intimates) 
takes place in a more private arena than other assaults (Lizotte, 
1985). This makes it harder to produce corroborating evidence, 
especially in terms of witness accounts (Lizotte, 1985). An argument 
has also been made that rape is a difficult crime to produce 
corroborating evidence for because there are often few visible 
physical cues that show the way the victim has been brutalized 
(Estrich, 1987; Lizotte, 1985). Often the physical harm that is done to 
a victim is genital or internal, as opposed to other forms of assault 
injuries that may be more visible, leaving cuts or bruises (Martin et. 
aLl. 
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Some states have required that rape victims be subjected to a 
polygraph. or lie detector test. This has been seen as another form of 
invalidating the victim's testimony (in a technologically advanced 
way) (Estrich. 1987). Many see the flaws of using a polygraph. in 
terms of the reliability of the test. As one rape awareness educator 
stated "most people start getting nervous. sweating. and their blood 
pressure rises just thinking about the rape; let alone when 
questioned about it for evidence." (Cygan. 1994) Again. the case is 
made that rape is being singled out as unique. and victims are being 
suspected of falsifying testimony (Estrich. 1987). 
One solution to the corroboration requirement. by more 
conservative reformers. is a state funded advanced method of 
evidence collection (Martin et al., 1985). The Rape Kit Exam was 
created to suite this evidentiary need. This exam can only be fully 
performed if the victim reports to the hospital very quickly. has not 
showered. and is wearing the clothes s/he was attacked in (Martin et 
al.. 1985). It has been argued that the kit is cruel. and not effective 
enough to merit it's use (Martin et al.. 1985). Others argue that 
evidence collection should not be improved; belief in victims' 
testimonies should (Martin et al., 1985). Nevertheless. the 
institutionalization of the Rape Kit Exam has been seen as a 
progressive step by some reformers (Martin et al.. 1985). 
In their discussion of the use and distribution of the Rape Kit 
Exam. Martin. DiNitto. Maxwell. & Norton discuss the personal 
repercussions that some rape law reforms might have (Martin et. 'al.. 
1985). Martin et. al. discussion is focused on changing the 
unnecessary trauma that a victim is subject to under the legal 
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system. Their study examined the way Rape Kits are administered: 
where, by whom, and what is actually being done. They studied the 
hospitals and rape crisis centers in Florida, where the state 
subsidized the kits. They found that a variety of individuals 
administer the kit depending on where it's done, who has the time 
and interest, and what the sex of the victim was. In terms of the 
procedures involved, they briefly discussed the controversy around 
standardizing the kit. The controversy consists of weighing 
jurisdictional freedom against having evidence be translatable across 
jurisdictions (Martin et. aI., 1985). 
One of the overarching issues in this discussion of 
standardization is what should actually be included when performing 
the exam (Martin et. aI., 1985). This discussion has revealed a 
tension in the interests of the heath-care system, the legal system, 
and the mental health-care system. In other words, some 
procedures that may yield better evidence may obstruct the 
physician's ability to treat the patient as quickly as needed. This 
procedure may also be deemed unnecessarily cruel and traumatic by 
rape crisis counselors. Martin et al. concluded that rape should be 
treated as any other crime, and that corroboration statutes are 
unnecessary. Since this is not the case, they recom mend that certain 
procedures that are cruel and rarely come into court as necessary 
evidence, should be abolished (i.e. plucking numerous pubic hairs out 
by the root to compare with the those of the assailant in order to 
determine whether intercourse had occurred). They advocated 
standardization of the most humane procedure possible. The feel 
that the Rape Kit Exam should not be administered in hospital 
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emergency rooms, but rather in rape crisis centers. They also 
recommend that the person who performs the exam be someone who 
has received training, and who wants to be an examiner, regardless 
of their official title. They advocated that governmental subsidies be 
granted for the kit and the training of examiners. They also 
hypothesized that the victim would greatly benefit from the 
examiners having undergone sensitivity training (Martin et. aI., 
1985). 
One study that has been done to evaluate the progress of laws 
that have rendered rape more similar to other criminal offense was 
done by Suresh Sahjpaul and K. Edward Renner in 1988. Their study 
investigated the way that Canadian rape reforms have actually 
played out in court. The new laws redefined rape as sexual assault, 
eliminated the need for corroboration, eliminated the need to prove 
penetration, and established rape shield laws (regarding sexual 
history of the victim). The researchers were attempting to 
understand the way the law functioned by observing sexual assault 
and physical assault court cases, and comparing the victim's 
experience. They measured this by analyzing the questions posed to 
the victim. They also reviewed statistics regarding conviction rates. 
Their conclusion was that both rape and other physical assault were 
..... undercharged in terms of the severity of the offense." (Sahjpaul & 
Renner, 1988). They also felt that the gains made by the reformers 
did little to actually change the experience of the victim, or raise the 
chances of rape trials ending in convictions Sahjpaul and Renner also 
expressed the view that Rape Trauma Syndrome experts (a 
discussion of which will follow below) should not be used because 
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they reinforce stereotypes. They feel that through this defense, 
psychologists contrib ute to the "further victimization" by classifying 
the victim as a "mental health case" (Sahjpaul & Renner 1988: 511). 
Their final word was "the new law has not altered the actual 
practices" (Sahjpaul & Renner 1988: 512). 
The argument that rape is similar to other forms of criminal 
assault is a tricky one to make. It often involves comparing forms of 
assault that may be extremely different in motive and context. The 
argument that all assaults are equal is a rather solid legal argument 
to make, however. By appealing to law makers' sense of equality 
and justice, many reforms have been enacted. The Difference school 
of thought comes into conflict with the concessions made by the 
equality based arguments. 
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Arguing That Rape Is Not Like Other Forms of 
Assault 
Reforms have also gone in the direction of focusing on the ways 
that sexual assault is different from other forms of criminal attacks. 
Most of these are focused on ways to alleviate the burden that the 
victim has to carry throughout the trial process, as well as increased 
punitive measures for the assailant (MacKinnon, 1984; Estrich, 1987). 
Some more extreme reformers have argued that the gendered nature 
of male-fe male rape should be retained within the legal language 
(MacKinnon, 1984; Brownmiller, 1975). They feel that rape should 
be treated as a special case; a crime against a sex-class (MacKinnon, 
1984). 
One theorist that sought to elucidate the differences between 
physical and sexual assault is Alan Lizotte (Lizotte, 1985). He 
enacted a large scale statistical analysis comparing the physical 
assault of women, the physical assault of men, and the rape of 
women. He used the 1978 National Crime Surveys Cities Attitude 
Subsample. The NCS used a stratified sample of individuals who 
were over the age of 12. Those women and men who had admitted 
on the NCS survey that they were the victims of these crimes were 
the ones that he focused on for his analysis. His finding was that 
respondents reported were more likely to report rape (50%) to the 
police than assaults on women (48 %), or on men (43 %). Lizotte felt 
that a multivariate analysis was necessary in order to fully examine 
the differences between these types of offenses. There were also a 
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variety of other variables (ages of victims and assailants, likelihood 
of being married, victim familiarity with assailants, right of assailant 
to be present in the place of the attack, property stolen, amount of 
victims, time of day, and involvement of a weapon). Lizotte 
theorized that there were different causal mechanisms for the two 
forms of assault. When he performed a multivariate analysis, it 
became clear that the victims that reported the rape to the police 
had very strong evidence to prove that the rape occurred. It was 
found to be a good deal stronger than the evidence provided by the 
physical assault victims who reported to the police. He found that 
the assault victims had more idiosyncratic patterns in reporting (the 
victim's age, the offender's age, the time of the assault, and whether 
or not it was completed) (Lizotte, 1985: 181). Rape victims, on the 
other hand, only reported when they had a strong case (i.e. there was 
theft as well, the assailant was a stranger, the offender had a right to 
be present, there was serious injury, or the victim was married and 
the assailant was not her husband). Lizotte also found three other 
factors that would probably be helpful in attaining a conviction, 
which were: the offender being black and the victim being white; 
more than one victim; and use of a weapon. While they would greatly 
influence in a finding of guilt, these factors (that prompted victims of 
physical assault to report), did not prompt rape victims to report the 
crime. He explained this as possibly being a function of the victims 
not knowing that these dynamics would increase their chances for 
conviction. Lizotte also reported one other variable that is significant 
for rape: highly educated women were less likely to bring the case to 
the police. He hypothesized that this could occur because highly 
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educated women might be more familiar with the criminal justice 
system's treatment of rape victims (Lizotte, 1985: 184). He 
concluded that the studies that have shown that rape is similar to 
other forms of criminal assault in terms of getting a conviction could 
be falling prey to an inadvertent censoring bias. He asserted that 
this occurs because, as his findings show, only the rape victims with 
the strongest cases get reported and are brought to trial, as opposed 
to other assault cases (Lizotte, 1985). 
One type of reform (that also corresponds to an increase in 
technology) is the use of video transmission when the victim is 
testifying. Reformers have advocated the use of video cameras so 
that victims that are terrified (or terrorized) by their assailants do 
not have to be exposed to them in court (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992; 
Gothard, 1987). While this has been done to alleviate the anxiety of 
the victim at hand, this reform has been primarily aimed at 
increasing the reporting rate of rapes (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992), The 
logic has been that the victim might be more likely to come forward 
if s/he knows that s/he will not have to face the attacker in open 
court. The focus of this battle has often been on allowing child 
victims of sexual assault to testify via video transmission (Gothard, 
1987). The reformers that have pioneered this fight have focused on 
the way fear and intimidation operated for children who have had 
their sexual boundaries invaded (Gothard, 1987). They have argued 
that other types of assault (i.e. physical) are less terrifying and 
stigmatized. This has led the m to advocate the use of video 
testimony only for rape cases, based on the unique issues involved 
(Frazier & Bordiga, 1992; Gothard, 1987). 
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The question of the way that sexual assault affects individuals, 
be they children or adults, is the focus of another type of reform as 
well. Some reformers have pushed to allow expert witness 
testimony to be admitted as evidence in rape cases (Frazier & 
Bordiga, 1992). The experts that they speak of are psychiatrists, 
psychologists, and counselors that have experience dealing with 
survivors of sexual assault. The aspect of sexual assault that these 
reformers felt needed clarification in the courtroom is what has been 
termed Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992). 
Rape Trauma Syndrome is a psychological term for the processes that 
some victims of sexual assault go through because of the trauma 
caused by the assault. Some of the symptoms are said to be chronic 
fear, anxiety, depression, social maladjustment, sleeping disorders, 
severe memory loss, etc.(Frazier & Borgida, 1992; Hazelwood & 
Burgess, 1987) The justification for allowing these individuals to 
give expert testimonies is that they, by observing the victim's 
symptoms and/or mental state, will be able to asses whether the 
victim has been sexually assaulted (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992) . 
Reformers have seen this as necessary to dispel myths about how a 
rape victim should act that are held by the jury and the courtroom 
officials (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992, Estrich, 1987). Furthermore it can 
been argued that this sort of expert testimony is vital because of the 
specific components of RTS. In other words, if one is seized with 
incapacitating anxiety whenever one thinks of the assault, testifying 
in court would be a near impossibility. 
In their article on Rape Trauma Syndrome, Patricia A, Frazier 
and Eugene Borgida explore the issues surrounding allowing 
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"experts" to testify that a victim of sexual assault is suffering from 
RTS (Frazier & Borgida, 1992). They examine the legal arguments 
against using RTS as evidence, such as the questions of helpfulness, 
prejudicial impact, and scientific reliability. They also go into the 
controversy about the qualifications of the expert witness. They 
examine the ways that these issues play out in case law, as well as in 
the available psychological research. Their article was not directed 
toward drawing conclusions, but rather toward a general discussion 
of the issues (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992). 
Arguments that rape should be legally treated as a special case 
are somewhat difficult to make under our legal syste m. Although 
this is the historical pattern that rape laws have followed, a 
progressive liberal stance would argue that to correct this historical 
pattern, we must render rape laws equal to other forms of assault. 
This is a case where the widespread mythology surrounding rape has 
helped the struggle, however. It seems that these arguments are less 
often heard because rape is still seen as a crime that is perpetrated 
by psychological deviants. This is especially true for most people 
when they compare a rape to, for example, an assault that has occurs 
during a theft. Although the belief that rape is a highly deviant 
crime had helped aid reforms that attempt to classify rape as a 
uniq ue and brutal crime, there has been a backlash in that it is more 
likely that those who fit the deviant image will be convicted. This 
basis for judgment does not aid in convicting (or reporting) the well 
respected members of society who are sexually violent, coercive, and 
invasive. 
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Rape Shield Laws, A Little of Each 
Another type of reform defies being boxed into either of the 
legal discourses of difference or equality. Arguments over the 
inclusion of rape shield laws have utilized components of the all the 
arguments that I have summarized above. Rape shield laws are 
statutes that render the victim's past sexual behavior inadmissible as 
evidence or as biasing statements during a trial (Chappell, 1976; 
Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). These laws have varied in the degree of 
extremity. For example, some theorists have advocated a total 
withholding of any form of information about the victim's sexual 
history, by arguing that it is never relevant to the case at hand 
(Spohn & Horney, 1991; Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). This has 
come from the radical school of thought that argues a (female) 
victim,'s word should never be challenged; and therefore it is all the 
evidence that the court needs (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). 
These theorists have taken the corroboration requirement and 
basically reversed it. Furthermore they have pointed to the way in 
which such evidence has been used to blame the victim for the 
assault (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). These reformers exposed 
the way in which prosecutors have painted pictures of the victim 
that portray them as unchaste, overly sexual, or nymphomaniacal 
(Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). Rape shield laws (regardless of 
the extremity of the reform at hand), were created to reduce the 
exploitation of the victim's past sexual history in court (Spohn & 
Horney, 1991; Winter, 1989). 
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The questions that the less extreme reformers have grappled 
with include a discussion of what evidence is appropriate (Winter, 
1989; Horney & Spohn, 1991). They have struggled over the 
admissibility of evidence that might reveal something about the 
victim's sexual activities, but might also reinforce her/his case 
(Winter, 1989; Horney & Spohn, 1991). What is often brought up is 
the question of the admissibility of physical evidence that the rape 
occurred (i.e. the attacker's semen collected from the victim's body, 
other proof that there had been sexual activity between the attacker 
and the victim, venereal disease transmission, etc.) (Spohn & Horney, 
1991; Winter, 1989). These issues have been seen as vital to 
winning cases by the more pragmatic reformers, and therefore 
necessary to allow. In order to insure that these pieces of evidence 
(that are usually collected during a Rape Kit Examination) are not 
used to bias the court's opinion of the victim' (through the exposure 
of his/her sexuality), reformers have pushed to explicitly state the 
exact components that are admissible (Horney & Spohn, 1991). They 
have also felt that the reasons for the exceptions to the general rape 
shield need to be made explicit. These types of shield laws have 
specified that the victims history will only be admitted if the 
prejudicial nature of the evidence does not outweigh the probative 
value (Horney & Spohn, 1991). This decision has often been left up to 
the court. Reformers have also argued that there should be in 
camera hearings before the evidence is deemed admissible (Spohn & 
Horney, 1991 ; Winter, 1989). 
Kathleen Winter, a legal theorist, delves into the issues 
surrounding the federal rape shield statute entitled the Federal Rule 
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of Evidence 412 (Winter, 1989). This was the first amend ment to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and was passed November 28,1975. 
Before this was passed prosecutors in a rape trials, as all other forms 
of criminal trails, were allowed to utilize character evidence. She 
points out the way that past sexual behavior was used to discredit 
the alleged victim's character in that "unchastity" in women was 
relevant, not only on the issue of consent, but also the as bearing on 
the complainants credibility (W inter, 1989: 954). This had been 
sanctioned by the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2). Character 
evidence included the admission of the victim's past sexual history. 
Rule 412 was passed as an exclusionary rule. It stated that the use 
of past sexual behavior is no longer permissible as evidence in rape 
trials. There are three exceptions to this Rule, however. What is 
admissible is evidence that is "constitutionally required", past sexual 
activity with the alleged assailant in order to flesh out the consentual 
nature of the act; evidence of the alleged victim's sexual activity with 
the alleged assailant or others in order to determine if the accused 
was the source of se men or injury (W inter, 1989). 
Winter feels that the battles that have taken place on the state 
level over rape shield laws is a critical piece of history leading up to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412. She states this, and goes on to examine 
the differing degrees of severity of rape shield laws that have been 
enacted on the state level (noting that nearly every state had 
included some type of rape shield reform). Winter's hypothesis is 
that these laws have been interpreted in ways that are not consistent 
to their meaning, nor the intentions of reformers. She writes on how 
relevant pieces of evidence have been excluded from cases because 
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of this misinterpretation. She feels that this is due, in part, to the 
more restrictive statutes that take the power of judgment away from 
the judiciary. She also notes that courts have taken measures into 
their own hands, and "redraft[ed] the applicable statute, while others 
held the statute unconstitutional as applied."(Winter, 1989: 979) 
Winter discusses how the three exceptions to the federal rape shield 
law give the courts the room that they need to make these 
judgments; yet in the case United States v. Shaw, the Eighth Circuit 
Court ignored the exceptions. She feels that the court, " ... exclud[ed] 
highly probative evidence critical to allowing the accused to defend 
himself", and that this functioned to, "violate his right to due process 
of the law."(Winter, 1989: 980) Winter explained this violation as 
unconstitutional, thus violating one of the three safety valves in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 (W inter, 1989). 
Cassia Spohn and Julia Horney, a Professor and an Associate 
Professor of Criminal Justice, have a different approach in their 
discussion of rape shield laws (Spohn & Horney, 1991). They, too, 
question the degree to which the officials (judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys) execute rape laws. Their intent is not to argue 
the constitutionality of the laws, but rather to see if the laws have 
significantly changed the way in which officials think about rape; as 
well as had an influence on trial proceedings. Their underlying goal 
is to examine the amount of imple mentation that rape shield laws 
have actually received (Spohn & Horney, 1991). 
Spohn and Horney note that all but two states, as well as the 
federal government, had adopted some form of rape shield law 
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by 1985. Since the degree of severity varies form state to state, 
Spohn and Horney decided on a sample of jurisdictions that 
represented the spectrum of reform legislation. They decided to 
investigate Michigan, Illinois, and Pennsylvania jurisdictions to 
represent states with restrictive rape shield laws. The states that 
were chosen to represent permissive shield laws were Georgia, Texas, 
and the District of Colu mbia (which in fact has no state shield laws, 
but rather has relied on case law precedents). They interviewed 
officials by giving them six hypothetical scenarios, and asking them 
to judge whether they would be used as evidence in court. Different 
aspects of a woman's (soon to be rape victim's) sexual history made 
up the content of the scenarios. Each of the stories were constructed 
to challenge the differing aspects of shield laws (Spohn & Horney, 
1991 ). 
The researchers state that the focus of their study is, "( 1 ) 
whether officials' responses vary among the six jurisdictions, and (2) 
whether different kinds of sexual history evidence evoke different 
responses." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: 140). They hypothesize that if 
rape shield laws are being implemented, then the officials' responses 
will correspond to their state laws. This would lead to a result of 
responses varying by jurisdiction. If the laws are not being 
recognized or implemented, however, the researchers expected to 
find that the judgment of what is admissible would pivot on what the 
specific scenario is. They also expected to find agreement across 
jurisdictions as to what is acceptable as evidence (Spohn & Horney, 
1991). 
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Spohn and Horney found that the most important factor in the 
decision of whether the sexual history in question should be 
admitted was the nature of the evidence (i.e. the content of the 
scenario) at hand. There was also a significant relationship regarding 
the official's jurisdiction and their judgment of admissibility. They 
reported that the official role (i.e. which position the respondent 
held) and the gender of the respondent did not significantly alter tl).e 
judgments. The researchers also found " ... a general correspondence 
between strength of the law and the officials' judgments that the 
evidence would or would not be ad mitted." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: 
153) Yet they were not able to simply order the responses by state 
shield statute (Spohn & Horney, 1991). 
Spohn and Horney did find that a reliance on informal norms 
was widely used. An example of this reliance on informal norms is, 
many officials state that they would not use (as evidence) the fact 
that the hypothetical victim has been in singles bar; but that they 
would use the fact that she had been engaging in sexual activity with 
several groups of men on the evening that she was attacked. Spohn 
and Horney state that this " ... reflects attitudes about the 
appropriateness of the sexual behavior described." (Spohn & Horney, 
1991: 1 54) They feel that another explanation is "criminal justice 
officials perceive a com mon connection between the 
'appropriateness' of the sexual relationship and the fairness of the 
trialfor the defendant." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: ISS) In other 
words, " ... the more deviant the behavior, the more relevant it is to 
showing a pattern of behavior." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: ISS) They 
also note that these judgments are in line with an acceptance of new 
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roles for women. Spohn and Horney also hypothesized that there are 
minimal (if any) incentives to comply with rape shield statutes. In 
fact, in light of the appeals system, there is a motive to "err in favor 
of the defendant." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: 1 S6) The researchers also 
suggested that some officials simply feel that sexual history is 
relevant, and therefore admit it. It was noted that in the states 
where in camera hearings were supposed to be held, they almost 
never were. This was attributed to the fact that the judge would 
prob ably allow the evidence to be presented anyway, so the hearings 
tend to be considered a waste of time (Spohn & Horney, 1991). 
An exploration of what their findings mean to the rape reform 
movement reveals that if the laws are to work at all, they need to be 
presented in the strongest way possible. The finding led the 
researchers to believe that the restrictive laws do not function to 
eliminate all use of sexual history, but rather regulate the degree of 
usage of the victim's past. They also noted that shield laws function 
best for those victims that have been raped by a stranger, because 
there will be less reason to begin delving into the victim's past (all 
states with shield laws include an exception regarding past sexual 
history with the alleged assailant). They concluded on an optimistic 
note, stating that most officials do support reforms. Overall, Spohn 
and Horney felt that there has been a significant shift in attitudes 
because of the new rape reform legislation (Spohn & Horney, 1991). 
Rape shield laws are a direct action against the misuse of 
victim's sexual histories. They seek to amend the assumptions made 
by officials and jurors by rendering aspects of a victim's history off 
limits. The difficulty with this is that the laws may be bypassed by 
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those in power who feel that this is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment (the right to due process of law); or those who simply 
think that it is inconvenient or wrong. Shield laws are an excellent 
but symbolic beginning to the fight that a victim of rape should not 
be judged on her/his sexual past. 
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Juror's. Attorneys. and Judge's biases in Sexual 
Assault Cases 
In their article "The Law's The Law, But Fair's Fair:" Rape Shield 
Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, Spohn 
and Horney hypothesize about an aspect that has been focused on by 
many legal theorists: the human bias when processing the laws. In 
this section I will summarize some of the findings of researchers that 
have sought to measure the influence of attitudinal variables upon 
the decision making process in the courtroom. The focus has often 
been on juror biases, but some of the braver researchers, like 
Matoesian and Horney and Spohn, have sought to examine the way 
officials' biases may influence the way that reforms have been 
carried out. 
Gregory M. Matoesian took an approach that is based on an 
assumption that the dynamics of the courtroom are oppressive to the 
victim (Matoesian, 1993). His agenda was to analyze how this second 
victimization occurs. Matoesian hypothesized that the speech 
patterns in courtrooms reflect the ways in which domination 
operates to put the victim on trial. bias the jury, and influence the 
rate of convictions. He also asserted that the patterns operate to 
reproduce the oppressive atmosphere that controls the trials' 
outcomes. Matoesian advocated a bottom-up approach to rape 
reform, that focuses on the speech dynamics within the courtroom. 
His argument was that "reproducing rape" is an active process within 
the courtroom. Because it has to be produced, it can be amended. He 
felt that reformers should focus on undoing these specific dynamics, 
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rather than focusing on broader, more general legal issues 
(Matoesian, 1993). 
Peter j. Nelligan searched for the connections between the 
gender of the jurors and conviction rates in rape cases (Nelligan, 
1988). His premise was that sexual assault is different form other 
crimes in that the juror's gender might predict the outcome, more so 
than in other crimes. He attempted to analyze cases from Oahu 
between 1955 and 1977 by going back and determining the 
gendered make-up of the individual juries. He hypothesized that he 
would be able to determine the gendered differences in opinion by 
comparing the mean number of women on acquitting and convicting 
juries. He found that the mean number of women on acquitting 
juries slightly higher than in those where there was a conviction; yet 
the difference is not statistically significant. He cautions that this 
does not prove that a juror's gender has no bearing on the decision 
that they would make, but rather that the turn out in these cases did 
not depend on that factor (Nelligan, 1988). 
Nora K. Villemur and Janet Shibley Hyde attempted to tie 
together some of the factors that might influence individuals to 
convict or acquit the defendant in a rape trial (Villemur & Hyde, 
1983). Their study was influenced by past research done by N. L. 
Kerr who found that in automobile theft cases the '"attractiveness'" of 
the victim was a found to be a partial determinant of the finding of 
guilt. Villemur and Hyde felt that this might be a significant 
determinant in the outcome of rape cases as well. They tested mock 
juror's responses to age and attractiveness of the rape victim, as well 





searching for any finding of a gendered difference in the decisions of 
the mock jurors (Villemur & Hyde,1983). 
Villemur and Hyde found that the gender of the defense 
attorney had a great deal of bearing on the decision of the mock 
juror. If the defense attorney was a woman, there was a much 
greater chance of the mock juror handing down a finding of not 
guilty. 71 % of the respondents stated that they would acquit the 
accused if the defender was a woman, while only 49% would acquit if 
the attorney was male. There were no significant findings regarding 
age and attractiveness on the victim, or the gender of the 
respondent. The one exception was that older victims were rated as 
more respectable, and therefore the defendant was seen as more at 
fault for the assault (Ville m ur & Hyde, 1983). 
In the discussion of their findings, Villemur and Hyde 
hypothesized three possible reasons why the mock jurors reacted so 
strongly to the female defenders. The first was that the respondents, 
due to pervading sexism, were so amazed that a woman could be a 
competent lawyer that they "overvalued" her performance. The 
second hypothesis was that the juror's perceptions of a woman that 
would choose to defend a rapist (i.e. allegedly doing this to the 
disadvantage of her gender) brought about a feeling of respect; and 
thus, her performance became more believable. Their third possible 
explanation was that the litigator and the woman on trial are sub ject 
to the mock juror's comparative gaze. The juror finds the female 
prosecuting attorney more respectable, thus devaluing the victim 
and her experience. The researchers ad mitted that these hypotheses 
needed to be studied further. They go on to point out some of the 
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flaws of their study: the lack of a group decision making process, the 
difficulty in reproducing trial dynamics, and the lack of pre-trial 
selection that serve both the prosecutor's and the defender's 
interests. All of these serve to render the findings somewhat less 
valid (Villemur & Hyde,1983). 
Horney and Spohn, in their study entitled Rape Law Reform 
and Instrumental Change in Six Urban jurisdictions, explored the 
impact that rape law reforms have had in six jurisdictions that 
represent the spectrum of reform extremities (Horney & Spohn, 
1991). The researchers collected court records data from (adult) 
rape cases between 1970 to 1984. They also collected data on the 
number of rapes reported to the police at that time. The jurisdictions 
that they studied (progressing from most extreme reforms to the 
least) were: Detroit, Michigan; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; 
Philadelphia County (Philadelphia), Pennsylvania; Harris County 
(Houston), Texas; Fulton County (Atlanta), Georgia; and Washington 
D.C. (Horney and Spohn, 1991: 122) 
Horney and Spohn's results showed that the reforms enacted in 
these states had very little effect on the reporting of rape, or the 
processing of rape cases (Horney and Spohn, 1991: 129). They found 
only a slight impact in Detroit. The results showed that in Detroit, 
because of the 1975 reforms, there was an increase in reporting; as 
well as an increase in the ratio of indicted to reported case, Their 
results also showed, however, that there was, " ... no change in the 
percentages of indictments resulting in conviction, in convictions on 
the original charge, or in the percentage of convictions resulting in 
incarceration." (Horney and Spohn, 1991: 129) They noted that the 
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increase in reporting was not consistent with an increase in reporting 
for other violent crimes, and therefore could be attrib uted to the 
rape law reforms (Horney & Spohn, 1991). 
The participants in the legal decision making process possess a 
great deal of power over the way rape law reforms will be enacted. 
This has been amongst the most difficult hurdles for reformers. Not 
only does changing the opinion of people take a great deal of time, 
effort, and capital; but I would hypothesize that it is relatively 
difficult to influence those who control the legal processes. Carole 
Goldberg-Ambrose comments on the fact that substantive change 
may not occur until those who learned about the reforms in law 
school sit on the judicial bench (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). Although 
changing the courtroom participants' opinions of rape is an uphill 
battle, it is becoming all too evident that this attempt at changing 
courtroom actors' attitudes on rape is pivotal to rendering rape law 
reforms effective (Horney & Spohn, 1991). 
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The Racialized History of Sexual Violence 
Throughout much of this essay I have referred to the generic 
victim. I have done this to be consistent with the language of the 
works that I have been handling. Most of these works did not focus 
on the role that racial issues played within rape law reform. 
African-American Fe minists, and African-American legal theorists 
have produced works that are focus on the dynamics between racism 
rape legislation (Wriggins, 1983; Hall, 1983; Bumiller, 1987). I have 
chosen to present this analysis in it's own category because of the 
overwhelming exclusion of this in depth exploration by the other 
rape law reformers. I did not want to present this material as being 
accepted as normative to the rape reform movement, when in fact it 
has been so ignored. I will first present a brief historical analysis of 
African-Americans' experience of rape. I will then go on to examine 
the way that theorists have tied this into rape law reforms. 
There is a racial history to sexual assault in this country (Davis 
1981; Hall. 1983; Wriggins, 1983; hooks, 1984; Bumiller, 1987; 
Collins, 1990). The racial nature of rape is best exemplified through 
the law's treatment of African-American men and women (Hall, 
1983). During slavery, it was completely legal to sexually assault 
African-Americans (Hall, 1983; Wriggins, 19831. Slave holders 
utilized sexual violence both to enforce social control. and as a means 
of reproducing the slave population (Hall, 19831. The rape of 
African-American women by white men was widely enacted because 
the children that the slave woman had (that would also be owned by 
whites) would have a lighter skin tone (Hall, 1983; Collins, 1990). 
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This increased a slave's market value, thus rendering rape as a 
profitable enterprise for white men (Collins, 1990). However, if 
there was an interracial cou piing of an African- A merican man and a 
white woman the man was likely to be brutalized or killed (Hall, 
1983). Often the violence enacted against African - A merican men 
had a sexual component as well (i.e. genital torture) (Hall, 1983). 
The sexual abuse of African-Americans was used as a form of 
social control during the Emancipation era (Hall, 1983; Giddings, 
1984). Widespread lynching of African-American men was justified 
by accusing the m of com mitting sexual offenses against white women 
(Hall, 1983; Giddings, 1984). This was an informal exercise of racist 
formal and informal laws. As these atrocities became recognized as 
illegal. the formal legal system began to perform historically similar 
atrocities (Hall, 1983; Wriggins, 1983). The numbers of lynchings 
reduced; but the number of African-American men that were 
executed by the courts for sexually assaulting white women stayed 
extremely (and disproportionately) high (Wriggins, 1983). 
The extreme differential between the conviction rates of 
African-American men and white men has brought African-
American Feminists and legal scholars to question if rape law reform 
is actually going to bring about justice (Wriggins, 1983, Bumiller, 
1987). If the reforms that are enacted attempt to institute stronger 
sentences for assailants, without exploring the racial dynamics of 
rape, they could serve to further these racist trends. The reforms 
need to attempt to integrate the racial issues, and correct for them. 
Unfortunately, most of the reform literature has not integrated the 






involved (Wriggins, 1983, Bumiller, 1987). This has been seen as 
unacceptable by many African-American theorists (Wriggins, 1983, 
Bumiller, 1987). 
African-American women have been discriminated against 
legally in a complementary way (Wriggins, 1983; Collins, 1990). 
African-American women, whether they are raped by a white man 
or a man of color, have an extre mely hard time getting a conviction 
(Wriggins, 1983). Historically, sexually assaulting an African-
American woman has been legal (Wriggins, 1983). This trend has 
filtered through the current legal system (Wriggins, 1983). One way 
that this discrimination has manifested itself is through racist/sexist 
stereotypes that portray African - A merican women as overly sexual 
(Wriggins, 1983, Collins, 1990). Because of this racism, African-
American women's have had an extremely difficult time proving that 
they did not consent to the sexual assault (Wriggins, 1983). The 
rationalization goes along the lines of: African-American women are 
more sexual, therefore, the woman in question must have wanted to 
have sex with the alleged assailant. These stereotypes coincide with 
the myths that rape law reformers have attempted to dispel through 
their various arguments (i.e. enacting rape shield laws, abolition of 
corroboration and resistance requirements, amending definitions 
etc.) (Wriggins, 1983). The difference is that African-American 
analyses are race specific, and serve to point out the systemic nature 
of racist sexism. They point out that no matter how restrictive a 
shield law is, it will not amend the racial discrepancies that 
occur (Wriggins, 1983; Bumiller 1987). In fact, most of the reforms 
that might function if there was no racial discrepancies made are 
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irrelevant to women of color as this discrimination persists 
(Wriggins, 1983; Bumiller, 1987). 
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Method 
I conducted a descriptive, exploratory study by distributing a 
survey through the mail. The survey contained questions to 
determine the respondents' opinions on the existing rape laws in 
Ohio. The aspects of the rape laws that the respondents were asked 
to comment on were ones that have been debated by rape law 
reformers. The sample that I distributed the survey to consisted of 
two groups: workers within the field or rape crisis counseling, and 
criminal attorneys or legal advocates. 
The sample populations that I surveyed were not randomly 
selected, therefore my findings are in no way generalizable. I found 
appropriate individuals by networking through those I knew in the 
fields. The participants range from unemployed volunteers to those 
holding J.D. and PhD. degrees. 
Ohio Rape Law 
I feel that an overview of the Ohio sexual assault legislation is 
necessary to better understand my findings. Ohio is a relatively 
progressive state in terms of rape law reform. The definition of rape 
is gender-neutral, and includes forced oral sex and forced anal sex. 
It does not account for sexual assault where a penis is not the 
penetrating object. The law prohibits the impairment of a victim's 
judgment through the distribution of mind altering substances. 
There is an explicit statement that resistance is not required of a 
victim in order to prove that a rape occurred. There is also no 
corroboration require ment. 
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Ohio has a relatively permissive rape shield law. It states that 
the sexual history of the victim is ad missible as evidence if it is 
necessary to prove the origin of semen, disease, and/or 
impregnation. The victim's history is also ad missible if involves 
sexual activity with the offender This is only so if the court finds 
that, "".the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that 
its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its 
probative value." (Ohio Revised Code 2907.02,1993: 101) There is 
also a specification that these shield laws are left to the court to 
judge when and how they should be enacted. It is added that these 
judgments should be made during in camera hearings. 
Spousal im m unity is explicitly denied for cases of sexual 
assault. The way that this reform was incorporated, however, is that 
within the definition of rape there is a specification that the victim is 
not the spouse of the offender. It is included in the latter section of 
the law that proof of marriage is not a defense against rape. 
Medical treatment for the victim is funded; and that the state is 
required to pay for treatment of venereal disease for both the 
offender and the victim as well. The Code also specifies that all state 
hospitals are required to staff a physicians (on call twenty-four 
hours a day) that specialize in the treatment of victims of sexual 
assault. The state of Ohio has also rendered child victims' video 
testimonies legal. On a final note, in the section of the Ohio Revised 
Code, # 29 entitled "Importuning", there is a section that prohibits 
sexual solicitation from a person of the same gender, if it is known 
that the individual being solicited is hostile to homosexuality. I 
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included questions about this in my survey in order to observe the 
way the respondents accepted this piece of legislation. 
Hypothesis 
My hypothesis was that I would find different responses to the 
questions on the basis' of field (rape counseling or law)' gender, 
marital status and education level. I expected women, individuals in 
the counseling field, single or cohabiting individuals, and individuals 
with a middle range-education level to be more positive about rape 
reform legislation. I guessed that these variables would factor in this 
manner because the individuals that I described would probably be 
more likely to be members of the Second Wave Feminist Movement, 
the Anti-rape Movement, and the rape law reform sub-movement. 
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Results 
I received 76 of the 200 surveys that I distributed. About 55% 
of the sample was female, and 45% was male (SD=.51. Racially the 
sample was comprised of: 7.9% African-American, 1.3 % Asian, 1.3 
Mexican - American, 85.5 % Euro- A merican, and 1.3 % classified 
themselves as "other" (SD=1.2). 30.7% of the population was single, 
58.7% was married, 1.3 % classified the mselves as cohabiting, and 
6.7% checked the category "other" (SD=.9). In this category a good 
deal of the people that checked "other" wrote in that they were 
divorced. The mean age was 36.7 (SD= 11.6). The mean income level 
was $30,7015 (SD=27582.11. The average amount of education was 
18 years. 40 respondents reported that they had received some 
education in the field of law. The mean number of years of legal 
education for this group was 13.6 (SD= 1 0.1). 55 people had sexual 
assault related education; the mean value in years being 7.9 (SD=7.8). 
~ 
Crosstab ulation tables that were run with gender as the 
independent variable showed that all of the respondents (that 
answered the individual questions) agreed or strongly agreed with 
several independent variables. They all agreed that the portions of a 
victim's past sexual history that is defined as the exception to the 
shield laws was acceptable (N=69, SCC=-.4799)'. They also all agreed 
that evidence of past sexual behavior with the offender should be 
admissible as evidence (N=63, SCC=-.619). 
The respondents all felt that the awkward structuring of the 
spousal immunity law might effect the way the law is carried out 
• SCC refers to the Spearman Correlation Coefficient. For the crosstabulation 
tables, see appendix. 
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(N~50, SCC~-.3037). Nearly the entire sample agreed that the rape 
laws should be gender-neutral (N ~ 72, SCC~.183 9). All the 
respondents that expressed an opinion on the ad missibility of expert 
testimony on rape trau ma syndrome (and related syndromes) 
expressed that they felt that it was valid evidence (N~65, SCC~.5218). 
This was also true when the independent variable was occupation 
(N~64, .3784). Again, nearly the entire sample agreed that video 
testimony should be allowed for both child and adult victims of 
sexual assault (N~71, SCC~.5359, and N~70, SCC~.4419 respectively). 
Aside form the rape shield legislation, this sample appeared to 
be extremely permissive of rape law reforms. I did not measure 
their reaction to the reforms when applied to other forms of assault, 
and therefore can not state that they are rape law reform advocates. 
They could be advocates of all criminal assault law reform. 
An interesting finding was that, the field (rape counseling or 
law) that the respondents were in had very little bearing on the way 
they answered questions. The only areas in which there was a 
significant correlation between field and an attitudinal variable were 
questions about lie detector tests. The first question I asked was 
whether or not the respondent felt that a rapist should be forced to 
take a lie detector test. Only 50 individuals responded, the 
significance level (a Pearson's Chi-Squared) was ,03263, and the 
correlation coefficient (SCC) was .3784. The table (see Appendix II. 
FIELD by LIERAPE) showed that 37.5% of the counselors, and 46.3% 
of the lawyers felt that the test should be administered to rapists 
(agreed, and strongly agreed); while 37% of the counselors, and 57.4% 
of the lawyers did not (disagreed and strongly disagreed). The next 
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table has field as the independent variable, and asks the question, 
should the survivor have to undergo the lie detector test, as the 
dependent variable (see Appendix II FIELD by LIESURV: N~50; Chi-
Square~.03060; SCC~.27l51. 13.3% of the counselors agreed that the 
survivor should undergo the test, and 38.5% of the lawyers did so. 
In terms of disagreeing or strongly disagreeing 88.6% of counselors 
did, while 61.1 % of lawyers fell into one of these two categories. 
This makes logical sense in that the counselors were probably 
more likely to be sympathetic to the victim's experience; and a lie-
detector test could quite easily be seen as a method of doubting 
his/her experience. From the other side, the attorneys would 
probably prioritize gathering evidence for the case, and may have 
seen this form of data gathering as necessary. Another factor that 
might have influenced the respondents, which I saw commented on 
in several of the open ended questions, is the amount of skepticism 
that the test has met. This might account for less people being 
willing to advocate it's use in either field. 
Overall, my hypotheses were in not proven. The lie detector 
test was the only cite,in which the relationship between attitudes 
and occupational/volunteer positions were Significantly correlated at 
all. Education, gender, and marital status were in no was shown to 
be significantly related to the attitudinal variables. 
This does not, necessarily prove that my hypothesis was wrong. 
My sample was fairly small, and not random. Therefor I can not 
generalize my findings to counselors and lawyers at large. There was 
also a good degree of crossover between the two fields that might 










The rape law reform movement has effected many changes. It 
has fundamentally challenged the way many individuals have 
conceptualized the legal and social institutions within the United 
States. I have only been able to scratch the surface of what these 
actions mean in a wider context. The intersection of feminism and 
the law is one wrought with difficulties. Many feminist legal 
theorists write pessimistically about how the law is ineffective until 
formidable social change occurs (Bartlett & Kennedy. 1993). Many of 
the achievements made by the rape law reform movement are. 
therefore, said to be more symbolic than effective (Goldberg-
Ambrose, 1992). 
I would argue that legal symbolic change needs to occur. Social 
change is a slow process, that needs to operate on many levels 
simultaneously. Clearly, the rape law reform movement's tendency 
to not be self-conscious about the racialized history of rape needs to 
cease. There needs to be further interrogation into same-sex issues, 
and issues affecting working class individuals, as well. It is 
important that there be a more comprehensive overview of the goals 
of the movement that can account for difference. specifically 
differential oppressions. Working through the syste m is an 
extremely challenging task for marginal thinkers. It often requires a 
good deal of compromise. The rape law reform movement has 
compromised a great deal by transforming personalized feminist 
texts into legislative language. It needs to move one step further, 
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and compromise some of the movement history to account for the 
history of rape in the United States. 
Thinkers such as Matoesian, Horney & Spohn, and Wriggins all 
challenge the reform movement to probe more deeply into affecting 
attitudinal change through legislation. I feel that this is the direction 
that the movement needs to take in order to recognize its goals. This 
could take place in law schools, legal professional organizations, in 
legal journals, or in the courtroom. This is a massive challenge, but 
one that might serve to truly affect and reduce the patterns of sexual 
violence within this society. 
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Age (in years). 
AGE 
Number of Cases: 75 
Missing Cases: 1 
Mean: 36.693 
Mode: 40 
Standard Deviation: 11.647 
Gender of the respondent. 
SEX 
Number of Cases: 76 
Missing Cases: a 
Mean: 1.447 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .501 
Race of the respondent. 
RACE 
Number of Cases: 76 
Missing Cases: a 
Mean: 4.697 
Mode: 5 
Standard Deviation: 1.200 
Vocational position held by the respondent. 
POSITION 
Number of Cases: 75 
Missing Cases: 1 
Mean: 2.893 
Mode: 4 




Income (in dollars per year). 
INCOME 
Number of Cases: 57 
Missing Cases: 19 
Mean: 37014.912 
Mode: 30000.000 
Standard Deviation: 27582.124 
Marital status. 
MARRIED 
Number of Cases: 75 
Missing Cases: 1 
Mean: 1.902 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .912 
The respondent's parental status. 
KIDS 
Number of Cases: 76 
Missing Cases: 0 
Mean: 1.408 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .495 
Amount (number) of children. 
AMTKIDS 
Number of Cases: 46 
Missing Cases: 30 
Mean: 2.087 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: 1.029 
Years of education. 
EDUCAT 
Number of Cases: 71 
Missing Cases: 5 
Mean: 17.993 
Mode: 19 
Standard Deviation: 2.412 
Number of years of education in a law related field. 
LAWED 
Number of Cases: 40 
Missing Cases: 36 
Mean: 13.575 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: 10.078 
Years of education m a field related to sexual assault. 
SEXASSED 
Number of Cases: 55 
Missing Cases: 21 
Mean: 7.971 
Mode: 3 
Standard Deviation: 7.824 
Area of focus that respondent is in (i.e. rape counselling, law, or both) 
(THis is a composit variable created from LA WED and SEXASSED; 
I=LA WED; 2=SEXASSED; 3=BOTH; 4=MlSSING VALUE) 
FIELD 
Number of Cases: 72 
Missing Cases: 4 
Mean: 2,083 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .746 
Respondent's opIlllOn on whether all sexual activity between 
consenting adults in private should be legal. 
CONSENT 
Number of Cases: 72 
Missing Cases: 4 
Mean: 2.028 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: 1.256 
Respondent's opinion on whether there should be a distinction 
between female-male rape and male-female rape. 
DISFMMR 
Number of Cases: 69 
Missing Cases: 7 
Mean: 1.942 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .235 
Respondent's opinion on whether the penalties for childhood sexual 
assault should be the same for both genders. 
EQPENMF 
Number of Cases: 72 
Missing Cases: 4 
Mean: 1.056 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .231 
Respondent's opinion on whether the law for rape should be gender 
neutral. 
GENDNEUT 
Number of Cases: 72 
Missing Cases: 4 
Mean: 1.819 
Mode: 1 




I , . 
Respondent's opInIOn on whether do you feel that someone should 
get punished for propositioning someone of the opposite sex into a 
sexual encounter if they know the person is hostile to the offer. 
HETIMP 
Number of Cases: 59 
Missing Cases: 17 
Mean: 2.644 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: 1.310 
Respondent's opInIOn on whether a male-female rape should carry a 
heavier sentence than a same-sex rape or vice versa. 
HEVSCEN 
Number of Cases: 4 
Missing Cases: 72 
Mean: 1.250 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .500 
Respondent's opinion on whether a male-male rape should carry a 
heavier sentence than a female-female rape or vice versa. 
HEVSCEN2 
Number of Cases: 0 




Respondent's opinion on whether a female-male rape should carry a 
heavier sentence than a male-female rape or vice versa. 
HEVSCEN3 
Number of Cases: 4 
Missing Cases: 72 
Mean: 2 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .000 
I . 
Respondent's OpInIOn on whether a female child molester should 
receive a heavier sentence than a male, or VIce versa. 
HEVSCEN4 
Number of Cases: 4 
Missing Cases: 72 
Mean: 2 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .000 
Respondent's opinion on whether a husband raping his wife should 
receive a heavier sentence than a rape with the same gender 
combination without the marital component, or vice versa. 
HEVSCEN5 
Number of Cases: 63 
Missing Cases: 13 
Mean: 2.143 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .435 
Respondent's opinion on whether a wife raping her husband should 
receive a heavier sentence than a rape with the same gender 
combination without the marital component, or vice versa. 
HEVSCEN6 
Number of Cases: 56 
Missing Cases: 20 
Mean: 2.036 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .426 
The respondent's opinion on the punishment for "Importuning." 
HIMISD 
Number of Cases: 42 
Missing Cases: 34 
Mean: 1.952 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .697 
Respondent's opllllOn on whether do you feel that someone should 
get punished for propositioning someone of the same sex into a 
sexual encounter if they know the person is hostile to the offer. 
HOMOIMP 
Number of Cases: 62 
Missing Cases: 14 
Mean: 2.661 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: 1.390 
Respondent's opinion of the severity of the punishment for child 
molestation. 
KIDSCENI 
Number of Cases: 71 
Missing Cases: 5 
Mean: 2.042 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .917 
Respondent's opinion on the way the marital law IS structured 
LAWSTRUC 
Number of Cases: 50 
Missing Cases: 26 
Mean: 1.240 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .431 
Respondent's opinion on whether a rapist should have to tale a lie 
detector test. 
LIERAPE 
Number of Cases: 52 
Missing Cases: 24 
Mean: 3.808 
Mode: 5 





Respondent's OpInIOn on whether a rape survivor should have to tale 
a lie detector test. 
LIESURV 
Number of Cases: 52 
Missing Cases: 24 
Mean: 4.077 
Mode: 5 
Standard Deviation: 1.169 
Respondent's opinion on whether it should be left up to the court to 
decide whether or not to include a victim's past sexual history. 
PASSEXCOl 
Number of Cases: 63 
Missing Cases: 13 
Mean: 1.302 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: 4.973 
Respondent's opinion on whether it should be left up to the court to 
decide weigh the prejudicial nature of a victim's past sexual history 
against its probative value. 
PASSEXC02 
Number of Cases: 53 
Missing Cases: 23 
Mean: 2.340 
Mode: I 
Standard Deviation: 4.937 
Respondent's opinion whether past sexual actIVItIes should be 
admitted under the existing legal standards. 
PASTSEXI 
Number of Cases: 69 
Missing Cases: 7 
Mean: 1.754 
Mode: 2 




Respondent's OpInIOn whether past sexual activity with the offender 
should be used as evidence. 
PASTSEX2 
Respondents decision to rank the following In terms of what deserves 
the strongest to the weakest sentence: 
Female-female rape. 
RANKFF 
Number of Cases: 8 
Missing Cases: 68 
Mean: 3.125 
Mode: 3 
Standard Deviation: 1.035 
Female-male rape. 
RANKFM 
Number of Cases: 8 
Missing Cases: 68 
Mean: 3.125 
Mode: 4 
Standard Deviation: 1.126 
Male-female rape. 
RANKMF 
Number of Cases: 8 
Missing Cases: 68 
Mean: 1 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .000 
Male-male rape 
RANKMM 
Number of Cases: 8 
Missing Cases: 68 
Mean: 3.125 
Mode: 2 








The Respondents OpInIOn on classifying rape as an aggravated felony. 
RFELONY 
Number of Cases: 67 
Missing Cases: 9 
Mean: 2.537 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: 1.700 
The respondent's opinion on the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony as evidence. 
RP1RSYND 
Number of Cases: 65 
Missing Cases: II 
Mean: 2.062 
Mode: I 
Standard Deviation: 1.345 
The respondent's opinion on whether male-female rape should carry 
a heavier sentence that same-sex rape, or vice-versa 
SAMESEN 
Number of Cases: 9 
Missing Cases: 67 
Mean: 1.333 
Mode: I 
Standard Deviation: .500 
The respondent's opinion as to if the existing definition of rape lS to 
broad. 
SEXCONBR 
Number of Cases: 56 
Missing Cases: 20 
Mean: 3.929 
Mode: 4 
Standard Deviation: 1.263 
The respondent's opmlon as to if the existing definition of rape IS to 
narrow. 
SEXCONNA 
Number of Cases: 45 
Missing Cases: 31 
Mean: 3.422 
Mode: 4 
Standard Deviation: 1.118 
The respondent's opinion on whether there should be a distincton 
between same-sex and male-female rape. 
SSVSMFR 
Number of Cases: 74 
Missing Cases: 2 
Mean: 1.973 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: .163 
The respondent's opinion on whether video testimony m adult rape 
cases should be admissible or not. 
VIDEOAD 
Number of Cases: 70 
Missing Cases: 6 
Mean: 2.700 
Mode: 2 
Standard Deviation: 1.536 
The respondent's opinion on whether video testimony m childhood 
sexual assault cases should be admissible or not. 
VIDEOKID 
Number of Cases: 71 
Missing Cases: 5 
Mean: 1.930 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: 1.234 
L 
Respondent's opinion on whether a husband can rape his wife. 
HRAPEW 
Number of Cases: 74 
Missing Cases: 2 
Mean: 1.041. 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .199 
Respondent's opinion on whether a wife can rape her husband. 
WRAPEH 
Number of Cases: 63 
Missing Cases: 12 
Mean: 1.063 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .244 
Respondent's opinion on whether a woman can rape a man. 
WRAPEW 
Number of Cases: 74 
Missing Cases: 2 
Mean: 1.581 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .759 
Respondent's opinion on whether a woman can rape a woman. 
WRAPEW 
Number of Cases: 76 
Missing Cases: 0 
Mean: 1.083 
Mode: 1 




Respondent's opinion on whether a man can rape a woman. 
MRAPEW 
Number of Cases: 75 
Missing Cases: 1 
Mean: 1.293 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .540 
Respondent's opinion on whether a man can rape a man 
MRAPEW 
Number of Cases: 76 
Missing Cases: 0 
Mean: 1.237 
Mode: 1 
Standard Deviation: .428 
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Spearman's Correlation Coefficients 
FIELD BY LIERAPE 
Pearsons Coefficient=.3784 
FIELD BY LIESURV 
Pearsons Coefficient=.2715 
PosmON BY RPTRSYND 
Pearsons Coefficient=.3784 
SEX BY GENDNEUT 
Pearsons Coefficient=.1839 




SEX BY PASTSEX2 
Pearsons Coefficient=-.6197 
SEX BY VIDEO AD 
Pearsons Coefficient=.4419 
SEX BY V1DEOKID 
Pearsons Coefficient=.5359 






Tot Pct 1. 00 I 2.00\ 4.00 
1. 00 I 1 4 2 
I 8.3 33.3 16.7 
33.3 40.0 15.4 
2.0 8.0 4.0 
2.00 " 4 7 ~ 
12.5 25.0 43.8 
66.7 40.0 53.8 
4.0 8.0 14.0 




column 3 10 13 




Likelihood Ratio 15.19766 
Mantel-Raenszel test for 6.10808 
linear association 
Minimum Expected Frequency - .720 
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 8 OF 
Number of Missing observations: 26 






























































































Minimum Expected l!requency - 2.080 
Cells with Expected l!requencJ < 5 -
Number of Missing Observations: 26 
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>Statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns 
>is one. 
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Number of Missing Observations: 7 
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column 70 70 
Total 100.0 100.0 
>Warning # 10307 
>Statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns 
>is one. 
Number of Missing Observations: 6 
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Mantel-Raenszel test for 
linear association 
Minimum Expected Frequency -
I 
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I ~ , 
Please read each question carefully and either circle your choice, or 
write out your answer. The survey is on both sides of the page. 
1) What is you age (in years) 
2) What is your sex? 
[1] female 
[2] male 
3) How many years of education have you completed? 
4) Please list the degrees that you have earned. 
5) If you are in a law related field, how many years have you been in that 
field?_ 
6) If you are in a field that deals with sexual assault issues, how long have you 
been in that field?_ 
7) Are you currently 
[1] non-administrative paid staff 
[2] in an administrative position 
[3] volunteer 
[4] other (please specify) ______________ _ 
[5] no answer 
8) Please state your average yearly income. 
9) What is your race or ethnicity? 
[ 1] Black/African-American 
[2] Asian/Asian-American 
[3] Native AmericanlEskimo/Aleut 
[4] Mexican-American/Puerto Rican/Cuban American 
[5] White/European-American 
[6] Other (please specify) 
[7] No answer/don't know 
10) What is your religious affiliation? (please be specific) 




[4] Other (please specify) 
[5] no answer 
12) Do you have any children? 
[1] yes 
[2] no 
[3] no answer 
1 





If you answered "yes" to question #12, please answer questions #13 and #14. If 
you answered "no" or "no answer", please skip to question #15. 
13) How many children do you have? __ 
14) Please list the sex of you children, and their ages 
15) The law states, 
"The principle on which the first group of offenses (i.e. SEXUAL 
ASSAULTS)is founded is that sexual activity of whatever kind 
between consenting adnlts in private ought not be a crime."l 
Do you 




[5] strongly disagree 
16) If you disagree or strongly disagree, what sort of sexual actIvity between 
consenting adults in private do you think should be illegal? Please be specific. 
17) The Ohio definition of rape is based on ways that "Sexual conduct" is 
misused. Section 2907.01 (A) of the Revised Code states "'Sexual conduct' means 
vaginal intercourse between a male and female, and anal intercourse, fellatio, 
and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however 
slight is sufficient to complete vaginal and anal intercourse". 
Do you find this definition of rape too broad in it's scope? 




[5] strongly disagree 
18) If you strongly agree or agree with this definition, what would you 
exclude? 
19) Do you find this definition too narrow in it's scope? 




[5] strongly disagree 
20) If you strongly agree or agree that the definition is too narrow, what 
would you include that is not stated? 
2 
1 All quotations in this survey are taken directly from Page's Ohio Revised 







(For questions 21-41 I am referring to scenarios in which both parties are 
adults) 
21) In the case of rape, battery, or sexual harassment, is it appropriate to 
disregard the gender of the individuals in question? 




[5] strongly disagree 
22) I believe that a man can rape a woman. 




[5] strongly agree 
23) If you disagree or strongly disagree with the statement III #22 why? 
24) I believe that a woman can rape a man. 




[5] strongly disagree 
25) If you strongly disagree or disagree with the statement in #24, why? 
26) I believe a man can rape another man. 




[5] strongly disagree 
27) If you strongly disagree or disagree with the statement in #26, why? 
28) I believe a woman can rape another woman. 




[5] strongly disagree 
29) If you strongly disagree or disagree with #28, why? 
3 
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30) Under 2907.02 of the Revised Code the rape of one adult by another adult is 
a classified as "an aggravated felony of the first degree." 
How do you feel about this punishment? 
[I] too severe 
[2] appropriate 
[3] not severe enough 
[4] no answer 
31) Why do you think this? 
32) If you answered "not severe enough" to question #30, what sort of 
sentencing do you feel would be more appropriate? 
33) Do you feel that there should be a legal distinction between same-sex rape 




If you answered yes to question #33 please answer questions #34. and #35. If 
you answered no please skip to question #37. 
34) Which scenario do you feel should carry a heavier sentence? 
[1] male-female rape 
[2] same-sex rape 
35) Do you think that male-male rape and female-female rape 




If you answered yes to question #35, please answer question #36. If you 
answered no, please skip to #37. 
36) Which do you think should carry a heavier sentence? 
[1] male-male rape 
[2] female-female rape 
37) Do you feel that there should be a distinction between female-male rape 




If you answered yes to question #37,please answer question #38. If you 
answered no please skip to question #39. 






39) Please rank these sex crimes in order according to what you feel deserves 
the strongest to weakest sentence. Please do this by putting a one next to the 
crime you feel is deserving of the most severe sentence, and a four next to the 
crime you find deserving of the least severe sentence. Please skip this 
question if you don't see a hierarchy, or you don't consider any of the choices 
rape. 
_[a] male-female rape 
_[b] female-male rape 
_[c] male-male rape 
_[ d] female-female rape 
If you answered question #39, please answer question #40. If you did not 
answer question #39 please skip to question #41. 
40) Why did you rank the sentences for these crimes in #40 this way? 
41) Under 2907.02 of the Revised Code the " ... forcible rape of a victim under the 
age of 13 carries the penalty of life imprisonment." 
How do you feel about this punishment? 
[1] too severe 
[2] appropriate 
[3] not severe enough 
[4] no answer 
42) Why do you feel this way? 
43) If you answered "not severe enough" to question #42, what sort of 
sentence(s) do you feel would be more appropriate? 





If you answered yes to question #44, please answer questions #45 and #46. If 
you did not please skip to question #47. 
45)Which child abuser should be more heavily punished? 
[1] female 
[2] male 
46)Why do you feel this way? 




48) If you answered no to #47, please explain. 






49) If yes (to question #47), how do you think that a husband who rapes his 
wife should be sentenced in comparison to a man who rapes a woman who he 
is not married to? 
[I] more severe sentence 
[2] equal sentence 
[3] less severe sentence 
[4] neutral 




51) If you answered no to #50, please explain. 
52) If yes (to question #50), how do you think that a wife who rapes her 
husband should be sentenced in comparison to a woman who rapes a man who 
she is not married to? 
[1] more severe sentence 
[2] equal sentence 
[3] less severe sentence 
[4] neutral 
53) Section 2907.02, (A),(l) of the Revised Code states, 
"N 0 person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is 
not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the 
offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, 
when either of the following apply:". 
What follows is a succession of conditions that render the sexual conduct rape. 
Under the heading (G) is written, 
"it is not a defense to a charge under division (A)(2) of this 
section that the offender and the victim were married or were 
cohabiting at the time of the commission of the offense." 
Section (A)(2) states 
*****"No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the 
offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or 
threat of force." 
What do you think of the way this is structured? 
54) Do you think that this structure might affect the way the law is carried out 










55) The law states in section 2907.02, (D) of the Revised Code, 
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity, opInIOn 
evidence of the victim's sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the 
victim's sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it 
involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the 
victim's past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that 
the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and 
that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative 
value. 
Do you feel that the victim's past sexual activity should be admissible as 




56) Why do you feel this way? 
57) Do you think that evidence of the victim's past sexual activity with the 




58) Why do you feel this way? 
59) In reference to the question above, do you think that the court should 




60) Why do you feel this way? 
61) Do you think that the court is capable of deciding whether the 
"inflammatory or prejudicial nature" of the victim's past sexual activity with 




62) Why do you feel this way? 
63) In section 2907.02, (C) the Revised Code states: 
"A Victim need not prove physical resistance to the offender in 
prosecutions under this section." 
What do you think of this? 
7 









64) Do you feel that individuals who can explain phenomena such as Rape 
Trauma Syndrome, Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome or Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder should be admissible as expert witnesses in trials involving rape or 
childhood sexual assault? 




[5] strongly disagree 
65)Do you feel that adults that are alleged survivors/victims of sexual assault 
should be able to state their testimony in court via a video transmission from 
another room? 




[5] strongly disagree 
66)If you disagree or strongly disagree, why? 
67)Do you feel that children that are alleged survivors/victims of sexual 
assault should be able to state their testimony in court via a video transmission 
from another room? 




[5] strongly disagree 
68)If you strongly disagree or disagree, why? 
69) Do you feel that the result of a Polygraph or Lie Detector Test, performed 
on the alleged rapist or child molester should be admissible as evidence? 




[5] strongly disagree 
70) Why do you feel this way? 
71) Do you feel that the result of a Lie Detector Test, performed on the alleged 
survivor/victim should be admissible as evidence? 




[5] strongly disagree 










I 1 __ _ 
In the section titled "Imponuning" 2907.07, (B) of the Revised Code it states, 
"No person shall solicit a person of the same sex to engage in sexual activity 
with the offender, when the offender knows such solicitation is offensive 
to the other person, or is reckless in that regard" 
Under this law this activity is classified as a first degree misdemeanor. 
73) Do you feel that such an activity should be punished under the law? 




[5] strongly disagree 
74) Why do you feel this way? 
75) If you strongly agree or agree, what do you think of the classification of 
this activity as a first degree misdemeanor? 
[1] too severe 
[2] appropriate 
[3] not severe enough 
[4] neutral 
76) If you feel that this sentence is not severe enough, how would you classify 
this activity? 
77) If the law read 
"No person shall solicit a person of the opposite sex to engage in sexual 
activity with the offender, when the offender knows such solicitation is 
offensive to the other person, or is reckless in that regard" 
Would you feel that such an activity should be punished under the law? 




[5] strongly disagree 
78) If you answered disagree or strongly disagree to #73, would this addition to 
the legal code change your opinion? 
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